An opposition initiative to meet former president Joseph Kabila has drawn a warning of criminal prosecution from Kinshasa, exposing the difficulty of finding a political solution to a conflict that has outgrown the battlefield.
Peace negotiations are supposed to bring opposing sides closer to a solution. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, however, even deciding who should be part of the conversation has become a source of political confrontation.
On 4 November 2026, the Congolese government warned opposition politicians against traveling to Goma to meet former president Joseph Kabila without authorization. Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Jacquemin Shabani said those who proceeded could face criminal prosecution.
The warning followed an announcement by opposition leader Moïse Katumbi, who said the opposition coalition known as C64 intended to meet both President Félix Tshisekedi in Kinshasa and Kabila in Goma as part of an effort to promote national dialogue.
The proposed consultations place three major political figures at the centre of a dispute over the country’s future: the sitting president, his predecessor and an opposition seeking a role in resolving the crisis.
But the significance of the proposed meeting becomes clearer when one considers where it is supposed to take place.
A meeting in a city at the centre of a war
Goma is not simply another political destination. The capital of North Kivu province has been under M23 control since January 2025, following an offensive that dramatically escalated the conflict in eastern Congo.
For years, the country’s eastern region has experienced repeated violence involving armed groups, competition over resources and regional security disputes. The latest conflict has also deepened tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, with the United Nations documenting Rwandan support for M23, which Kigali denies.
Kabila’s presence in this environment makes the proposed visit particularly sensitive.
The former president, who governed from 2001 to 2019, has become associated with the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation, an alliance involving M23 and other opponents of Tshisekedi’s government.
Kinshasa accuses him of supporting the rebellion. Kabila denies the allegations and was sentenced to death in absentia by a Congolese military court in September 2025.
For the government, therefore, a meeting with Kabila in Goma carries implications that extend beyond ordinary political consultation.
Where does dialogue end and political risk begin?
Shabani has invoked Article 192 of the Congolese Penal Code, which provides for imprisonment in certain wartime circumstances involving unauthorised relations with subjects or agents of an enemy power.
However, the announcement of a proposed meeting does not establish that the opposition politicians have violated this provision. Whether it applies would require a legal assessment of the circumstances.
C64, which includes Katumbi, Martin Fayulu, Jean-Marc Kabund, Augustin Matata Ponyo and Delly Sesanga, says its objective is an inclusive political dialogue capable of addressing the country’s crisis.
Its proposed approach is to engage Tshisekedi before proceeding to Goma to meet Kabila.
That sequence is politically significant. The opposition is presenting the initiative as an attempt to involve competing centres of political influence in a conversation about the country’s future.
Yet the government faces its own dilemma: how does it engage a former president whom it accuses of supporting an armed rebellion without appearing to legitimise that rebellion?
Neither question can be dismissed.
The bigger problem is finding a way forward
The DRC’s crisis cannot be resolved by political declarations alone. Military operations have not removed the underlying tensions, while political divisions continue to complicate efforts to establish a lasting settlement.
The proposed C64 consultations may not produce an agreement. A meeting with Kabila would not automatically end the fighting, just as preventing one would not resolve the conflict.
But the disagreement exposes something important about the state of Congolese politics: the country needs a credible process for addressing its divisions, yet there is no consensus on who should participate or under what conditions.
That is a difficult starting point for any peace initiative.
For the millions of Congolese affected by insecurity, displacement and interrupted livelihoods, the debate is not ultimately about which politician wins the argument. It is about whether those exercising political and military influence can produce conditions in which ordinary people can live without the threat of violence.
The question now is whether Kinshasa and its political opponents can find a way to pursue negotiations without turning the process itself into another front in the conflict.
A country cannot negotiate its way out of a crisis if its political actors cannot agree on the conditions for sitting at the same table. What, then, would a genuinely inclusive path to peace look like for the DRC?
